Why might an Arab–Israeli alliance work to the Islamic Republic’s advantage?
Closer security ties with Israel may appear to some Arab governments to offer a way of containing threats from Iran. Yet the same cooperation could undermine their legitimacy at home. After the devastation of Gaza, joining a war against Iran would not necessarily be seen by Arab publics as simply taking sides between two regional powers. It could be understood as siding with a state held responsible for Palestinian suffering. This tension is particularly acute in Jordan and Bahrain, where different forms of domestic discontent could acquire a new focus through foreign policy. It is worth recalling that, after the Arab Spring began in 2010, the Islamic Republic described it as an “Islamic awakening.” Iran’s former supreme leaders, Ayatollahs Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei, had also expressed hopes for Arab revolutions that would support Iran’s Islamic Revolution.
This does not make a second Arab Spring inevitable. Public anger, organized protest and a crisis threatening a government’s survival are distinct stages. Nevertheless, governments that assess cooperation with Israel solely in terms of air-defense capabilities and American support may underestimate its social and political costs. The question is whether greater external security could come at the expense of deeper divisions at home.
Abu Dhabi and the uncertainty surrounding an alliance
Benjamin Netanyahu’s meeting with UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed on September 27 is confirmed. On September 28, Reuters cited the UAE’s official news agency’s confirmation and reported that, according to three senior Israeli officials, the talks lasted six hours and focused on Iran.[1] Anadolu also reported, citing the Israeli prime minister’s office, that the head of Mossad accompanied Netanyahu.[2] The visit’s security significance therefore cannot be dismissed as merely ceremonial.
Claims of a wider meeting involving Gulf leaders do not have the same level of confirmation. Anadolu relayed Israeli Channel 14’s account of representatives from several countries attending, explicitly presenting it as a claim. More importantly, on September 30 Reuters reported that a senior Saudi official had denied a meeting between Saudi and Israeli officials.[2][3] Accounts differ over who attended. Netanyahu’s presence alongside the Mossad chief does not establish that a joint decision to go to war was reached.
Even bilateral talks about Iran, however, could lay the groundwork for broader security coordination. For the public, the issue is not only what an agreement might contain, but also how it is communicated. When sensitive cooperation takes place behind closed doors, governments leave part of the narrative to foreign media, their opponents and rumor. Such uncertainty can erode trust, although it is not itself evidence of a conspiracy or a decision to attack.
Saudi Arabia’s appeal for US action against the Houthis
Saudi Arabia’s request for American military action against the Houthis has clearer reporting behind it. On September 11, Reuters reported, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Mohammed bin Salman had sought military assistance from Donald Trump. According to those sources, Washington declined direct strikes and offered intelligence sharing and targeting support instead.[4] The report indicates that Riyadh sought greater military pressure on the Houthis, but it is not an official announcement of a joint decision to enter the war.
A war against the Houthis must be distinguished from a war against Iran, although their political and arms-supply ties increase the risk of the two fronts converging. Operations intended to protect shipping could lead to clashes with Iranian personnel if they target weapons-supply networks. Retaliation could then turn a limited defensive operation into a broader conflict. This is an assessment of an escalation risk, not proof that Saudi Arabia sought such an outcome from the outset.
Nor does seeking American help necessarily mean aligning with Israel. A Guardian report on September 29, covering efforts to rebuild Saudi–Emirati cooperation in Yemen, discussed proposals for a joint command and the possible use of Israeli intelligence, while also highlighting Saudi reservations about Israeli involvement.[5] That hesitation matters. Arab governments may regard Israeli military capabilities as useful while fearing the political cost of openly embracing them.
A regional NATO or a looser security network
Israel’s efforts to connect its security to a network of Arab partnerships have a documented history. In June 2022, then defense minister Benny Gantz outlined plans for regional air-defense cooperation backed by the United States. Reporting at the time linked the initiative to countering missiles and drones from Iran and groups aligned with it.[6] The prospect of shared security infrastructure is therefore more than a recent conjecture.
On September 15, 2026, Axios also reported, citing two Israeli officials, that American, Israeli and Arab military commanders had held a secret meeting in Germany. Its account listed Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt among the participants. The meeting had not been officially announced by the countries involved.[7] This is evidence of reported military contacts, not confirmation of a collective-defense treaty.
“Arab–Israeli NATO” may be a useful shorthand for this trend, but it should not be mistaken for the name of an existing organization. NATO has treaty obligations and institutional structures; exchanging intelligence or coordinating interceptions does not by itself amount to the same thing. The phrase “Jewish–Arab alliance” also gives the issue an unnecessarily religious character. The parties are states pursuing political and security interests, not representatives of all Jews and Arabs. The relevant development is Israel’s gradual integration into regional security arrangements.
Gaza and the public limits of normalization
The depth of opposition to Israel should not be judged solely by street slogans. The 2025 Arab Opinion Index, based on fieldwork conducted between November 2024 and August 2025 in fifteen countries, found that 87 percent of respondents opposed recognizing Israel and 80 percent regarded Palestine as a cause shared by all Arabs.[8] These findings suggest a substantial gap between some official policies and public attitudes. Bahrain and the UAE were not included, however, and the overall figures cannot be applied to every country.
Gaza’s devastation provides a concrete context for these attitudes. The United Nations’ humanitarian appeal for 2026, drawing on assessments by the UN Satellite Centre, reported damage to approximately 81 percent of Gaza’s structures.[9] Destruction on this scale is far more than an ordinary diplomatic dispute for people across the region. Even those who oppose the Islamic Republic may see military cooperation with Israel as evidence that their own governments are indifferent to Palestinian suffering.
This exposes the limits of the “common enemy” argument. Governments may regard Iran as their principal threat, but their citizens need not rank their concerns in the same order. If protecting Israel is accompanied by silence over Palestine, opponents can turn foreign policy into a question of accountability: who made these decisions, what benefits do they bring, and what costs will the public bear?
Jordan and the domestic costs of security cooperation
In Jordan, country-specific data illustrate the importance of this divide. An Arab Barometer survey conducted in October 2025 among 1,266 citizens found that 95 percent viewed Israel unfavourably. Sixty-seven percent opposed normalization even if Israel recognized a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. In the same survey, 59 percent identified the economy as the country’s most important challenge.[10] These findings predate the wartime developments of 2026 and should not be presented as a measurement of today’s reaction.
Their significance lies in the potential for two grievances to converge: anger over regional policy and pressure on everyday livelihoods. If war damages tourism, trade, energy affordability or employment, objections to cooperation with Israel may become questions about the government’s performance at home. A citizen need not support Tehran to ask why their country should pay the price for military decisions made elsewhere.
The interception of Iranian projectiles in April 2024 also shows how the meaning of cooperation can be disputed. Reuters reported Jordan’s participation in downing drones and missiles passing through its airspace.[11] Protecting national airspace differs from allowing territory to be used to launch attacks. Yet that distinction is not always as clear to the public as it is in official statements.
If Jordan moves from air defense to facilitating offensive operations, the burden of explaining its policy to the public will increase. Conversely, Iranian attacks on Jordanian territory could strengthen a sense of national defense. The course of protest therefore depends not only on Jordan’s government, but also on Iran’s conduct and choice of targets.
Bahrain and the divisions war could deepen
Bahrain presents a different set of vulnerabilities. A September report by the US Congressional Research Service describes tensions between the Sunni ruling family and the Shia majority, alongside the legacy of the 2011 protests, repression and close security ties with Saudi Arabia and the United States. It also reports protests in predominantly Shia neighbourhoods at the beginning of the 2026 war.[12] Discussion of the country’s religious composition should distinguish citizens from migrant residents and avoid precise figures unsupported by transparent statistics.
Against this background, open alignment with Israel could bring political exclusion, religious solidarity and anger over Gaza into the same frame. For some opponents, the war might reinforce the belief that their government does not represent them in foreign policy either. But being Shia does not imply loyalty to Tehran. Bahraini demands for equal citizenship cannot be reduced to the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
One sign of the government’s sensitivity is the revocation of citizenship reported by Reuters on April 27. Bahrain’s Interior Ministry said it had stripped 69 people and members of their families of citizenship for supporting Iranian attacks.[13] These official allegations point to a political and security concern; they do not establish that most Bahrainis support the Islamic Republic or that the accusations were independently verified.
Repression can reduce visible protest while allowing a sense of injustice to accumulate. At the same time, Iranian attacks on Bahraini infrastructure, also discussed in the congressional report, can weaken sympathy for Iran.[12] Bahrain faces two pressures: the domestic legitimacy of its foreign partnerships and the safety of its citizens under retaliatory attack.
Khamenei’s killing and the struggle over the meaning of war
On March 1, Reuters reported that Iranian state media had confirmed Ali Khamenei’s death in American and Israeli strikes.[14] The political meaning of his killing is not uniform across the region. To opponents of Iran’s government, he symbolized repression. To some supporters, he represented resistance to Israel. Others may view the killing of a country’s leader as a dangerous escalation and a violation of national sovereignty.
The Islamic Republic may seek to turn his death into a narrative of victimhood and resistance. Open Arab participation alongside the attacking powers would give Tehran an opportunity to frame its dispute with its neighbors as a confrontation between governments aligned with Israel and the peoples of the region. That propaganda opportunity does not guarantee success. Repression inside Iran and its regional policies may limit the credibility of such a narrative.
Above all, sympathy for the Iranian people, condemnation of Khamenei’s killing and support for the Islamic Republic are different positions. Arab critics may adopt the first or second while rejecting the third. Tehran could benefit from increased pressure on rival governments without gaining support for its own political system.
From opposition to war to a political crisis
Turning anger into an uprising requires networks of mobilization, cooperation among different groups and sustained protest. For an uprising to threaten a government’s survival, divisions within the ruling elite and the conduct of the security forces also become decisive. Widespread opposition to Israel guarantees none of these conditions. The region’s experience should discourage easy predictions of governments falling in succession.
War can nevertheless bring previously separate grievances together. Economic pressure, a lack of accountability and a sense of complicity with Israel may provide a shared rallying point. Palestine and livelihoods in Jordan, political exclusion and sectarian tensions in Bahrain, and the economic and security costs of war elsewhere may each play different roles. Treating all Gulf states as a single political entity obscures these differences.
A joint statement issued by Egypt, Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia on September 22 supported Saudi Arabia’s defense and condemned Houthi attacks while also emphasizing diplomacy.[15] The region has therefore not simply divided into two camps ready for war. The choice between limited defense, offensive cooperation and negotiation remains a matter of political responsibility.
The central risk is an increased likelihood of unrest if governments openly join a costly war; another Arab Spring would still depend on domestic conditions. Governments that treat external backing as a substitute for public consent may gain military capabilities while losing social trust. For Jordan and Bahrain, that trade-off is particularly sensitive. Lasting security requires accountability for decisions that place a country on the path to war.
If a new wave of protest against Arab governments’ cooperation with Israel brings to power movements inspired by the discourse and model of Iran’s revolution—including its promise of popular government in place of secular, elite-dominated rule—one could speak of “exporting the revolution” in an ideological sense. This could occur even if those movements are not directed by Tehran and later come into conflict with the Islamic Republic. Yet neither Islamism nor opposition to Israel, on its own, demonstrates such influence, and a movement’s roots in civic organizations do not guarantee that its eventual government will be democratic. In the Middle East after Gaza’s devastation, grievances rooted in local conditions may overlap with Iran’s regional objectives without becoming subordinate to them. Governments that attribute every independent protest to foreign interference may, through repression and an excessive emphasis on security, deepen domestic divisions and reinforce the conditions the Islamic Republic needs to expand its influence. Fear of another Arab Spring may itself help explain these states’ hesitation to participate openly and actively with Israel and the United States in attacks on Iran.
Sources and notes
[5] The Guardian, September 29, 2026: efforts to restore Saudi–Emirati cooperation in Yemen.
[6] Arab News, June 20, 2022: plans for regional air-defense cooperation; also a syndicated Reuters report dated June 20, 2022. Additional Reuters link
[11] Reuters, April 14, 2024: Jordan’s prime minister warns against regional escalation.
[12] Congressional Research Service, Bahrain report, September 23, 2026; reproduced by EveryCRSReport.
[13] Reuters, April 27, 2026: citizenship revocations over alleged support for Iranian attacks.
[14] Reuters, March 1, 2026: Iranian state media confirm Khamenei’s death.
[16] Gulf Countries and Iran: Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation.
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