سال نو بر همگان مبارک باد به امید سال پر از پیروزی و امید برای ایران و ایرانی

An analysis of the 12-day Iran-Israel war: Israel failed to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

Clarification of Several Phrases: Many opponents of the regime and members of the opposition insist on using the phrase “war against the Islamic Republic” instead of “war against Iran.” While the rationale behind this intent is understandable, its validity cannot be fully endorsed. The reality is that, regardless of individual choices concerning the preservation of geographical boundaries, we find ourselves aligned with the Islamic Republic in maintaining a country called Iran. 

That the leadership of the Islamic Republic seeks to preserve this land solely for the sake of maintaining their rule—and that they may not hesitate to relinquish national territory if it becomes necessary to retain power—does not change the fact that, at this juncture, the people and the government share a unified position in safeguarding Iran. 

Therefore, it is inaccurate to claim that the current attack (by Israel on Iran) is merely an assault on the Islamic Republic and should be distinguished from an attack on Iran itself. The analogy is clear: no rational person would attempt to remove a cancerous tumor from a patient’s body using a butcher’s knife. 

Israel’s attack, aimed at toppling the Islamic Republic, serves as a foreign intervention that, through the use of force, terror, fear, and bloodshed, attempts to act more like a butcher than a surgeon—seeking to compel the people to participate in the removal of what it deems a malignant growth, i.e., the regime. We shall return to this topic again in the following lines.

Overthrowing the Islamic Republic: Many maintain that Israel’s objective in this attack was not the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, yet this is a baseless claim. The Israeli Prime Minister’s repeated insinuations prior to the attack—such as remarks suggesting that “we will soon meet in Tehran”—alongside the overt support of Reza Pahlavi’s supporters on social media, including demonstrations in which Israeli flags were carried, and Reza Pahlavi’s round-the-clock activities on the day of the attack and beforehand under the banner of preparing to return to Iran, all constitute clear evidence of Israel’s intention to overthrow the Islamic Republic, and even to facilitate the return of the Pahlavi dynasty to power.

In a BBC Persian article regarding Israel’s plan to overthrow the Islamic Republic, we read:

Let us not forget that Reza Pahlavi was the only prominent opposition figure to have recently met with Netanyahu. Farah Pahlavi( wife of last shah of Iran and mother of Reza Pahlavi ) has also joined this wave in recent times, expressing her determination to return to Iran. Israel’s attacks, which targeted and killed more than thirty high-ranking military and scientific figures, the strike on Evin Prison with the intent of freeing its inmates—signaling a breakdown in the regime’s control—and the assault on the parliament, along with the attempt to assassinate Khamenei (as Israel Katz revealed after the ceasefire, stating that they had intended to eliminate the Supreme Leader but had failed), all clearly indicate that Israel had come with the purpose of toppling the Islamic Republic.

We must also remember that just a day before the ceasefire was announced—at the very time when American bombers were returning from raids on Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan—Donald Trump spoke of the “MiGA Project,” or the idea Make Ira  great again .” At that stage, it appeared that both Netanyahu and Trump were prepared to take the risk of an operation aimed at overthrowing the Islamic Republic.

We will examine in the following lines the intended objectives behind this attempted overthrow, as well as Israel’s contingency plans in the event that it failed to bring down the Islamic Republic.

Why This Attack Must Be Condemned:

Given the history of U.S. and NATO interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya—and the catastrophic outcomes, including the rise of Islamic fundamentalist forces, the destruction of infrastructure, and the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives—as well as the terrifying assault by Russia on Ukraine, now we can believe that any foreign military attack on Iran or on another lands  must be unequivocally condemned. Those who encourage or support such aggression should be regarded as subordinates and agents of the invading power.

The people of Iran must, with discernment and minimal cost, bring down the Islamic Republic regime themselves. Foreign military intervention constitutes a violation of national sovereignty and the free will of the people to determine their own destiny. Let us not forget that no foreign power attacking Iran has any genuine interest in upholding the nation’s historical or national interests. Rather, such forces act primarily in pursuit of their own agendas, exploiting traitorous Iranians as bargaining chips to advance those goals.

From the very day the Islamic Republic was established, Israel—which had been an ally of the Pahlavi regime—granted refuge to fugitive SAVAK (The Bureau for Intelligence and Security of the State in period of shah in Iran ) officials and denounced the Iranian Revolution. Conversely, the Islamic Republic, by embracing the Palestinian cause and positioning itself as a leading advocate of justice in the Islamic and Arab worlds, effectively declared war on Israel. 

There is no doubt that the Islamic Republic has been intensely active in its hostility toward Israel. It has made extensive efforts to expand its influence among neighboring Arab countries, regularly burned the Israeli flag, openly called for the destruction of Israel, and—later—in the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center in Argentina, which resulted in dozens of deaths and hundreds of injuries, further demonstrated its aggressive posture. These actions suggest that the Islamic Republic has sought to exploit the Palestinian conflict to portray itself as the champion of the Islamic world and thereby facilitate the export of its Islamic revolution. 

In an effort to appeal to superficial nationalist sentiment within Iran, Khamenei and other leaders of the Islamic Republic have at times claimed that the presence of the Quds Force in Lebanon and Syria is primarily to arm and support the Lebanese and Palestinians against Israel, and to deter a possible Israeli assault on the Islamic Republic. However, it is widely understood that the regime does not believe in nationalist discourse and fundamentally views the preservation of Iranian territory as a means to safeguard the Islamic system.

In the months leading up to the October 7, 2023 attack, there was a noticeable intensification in the travels of leaders from Palestinian organizations (namely, Islamic Jihad and Hamas) to Iran, where they held meetings with Ali Khamenei. A document discovered in tunnels attributed to Hamas in Gaza—found by IDF —stated that Mohammad Deif, one of Hamas’s leaders, issued an order on October 23 to initiate operations against Israel. Around the same time, the final stages of the signing of the “Abraham Accords” between Saudi Arabia and Israel were expected to take place. The coordination between Khamenei and the Palestinian organizations was evident, as on Tuesday, Mehr 11, 1402 (corresponding to October 3, 2023), Khamenei issued a warning to Arab nations, cautioning them against moving too close to Israel, likening such an alliance to ‘betting on a dead horse.’ Exactly four days later, on the morning of Saturday, October 7, 2023 (Mehr 15, 1402), the October 7 operation began, during which Palestinian organizations launched a full-scale attack against civilian areas in Israel.

In the surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist forces launched an assault from the Gaza Strip on Kibbutz Kfar Kissufim, killing or capturing Israeli civilians.

Approximately 3,000 militants attacked southern Israel, and later that day, due to the breach of the border barriers, additional Gaza residents entered Israeli territory. In total, the attackers killed 1,139 people and abducted around 250 Israelis (according to Wikipedia).

Despite the clearly terrorist nature of the operation—during which at least 1,139 people were killed by the assailants—the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, believing the operation to have been successful in weakening the perceived deterrence of Israel against any attacks, publicly expressed support for the October 7 terrorist operation by stating that he ‘kisses the hands and arms of those who carried out this attack.’

Israel’s response to this horrific attack has thus far resulted in the deaths of 60,000 Palestinians, the destruction of more than 60 percent of Gaza, military strikes on southern Lebanon, and targeted attacks on Quds Force command centers in Syria. The suspicious death of Ebrahim Raisi  IRI president  in an air incident—widely attributed to Israel by many analysts—the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, in Tehran, and ultimately the disgraceful retreat of the Islamic Republic from Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad, all served as preludes to Israel’s offensive in Khordad 1404 (May–June 2025).

The main factor behind Israel’s decision—which was undoubtedly made in round-the-clock consultations with the United States—was Khamenei’s effort, following devastating blows from Israel in Lebanon, Syria, and Tehran, to orchestrate a form of domestic retreat and embrace a greater degree of coexistence and alignment in the realm of international relations.

Khamenei’s notion of ‘retreat’ did not imply a withdrawal from his anti-Israel stance or granting permission for political activity by reformist parties and movements within Iran. Rather, his intent was to gain acceptance—both domestically and abroad in Europe and the United States—under the current circumstances: a political environment in which all opposing factions have been suppressed, the middle class has been excluded from political participation, Syria and Lebanon have been lost as strategic allies, and uranium enrichment has surpassed 60 percent.

The meaning of “retreat” according to Khamenei’s logic is this: that both domestic and foreign opponents of the regime should recognize him in the current situation — where he has achieved uncontested authority inside the country, has taken regional security hostage, and stands on the verge of producing a nuclear bomb — and grant him guarantees for his regime’s survival.

Over the past year, emphasis by Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard on enforcing the hijab law noticeably diminished. Pre-sales of cars and gold were introduced as a way to support middle and affluent classes in preserving their assets amid rampant inflation. In major cities and provincial capitals, women and girls increasingly defied hijab requirements—some even refusing to wear headscarves altogether—openly embracing the latest European fashion trends. These cumulative signs of retreat ultimately led Khamenei, following the death of Ebrahim Raisi, to abandon his efforts to establish an entirely hardline government.

Historically, Khamenei had implicitly ensured the election of conservative candidates by engineering the electoral process. However, in this cycle, he signaled approval of the election of Masoud Pezeshkian—an obedient yet reformist figure—who was ultimately elected as the fourteenth president in July 2024 (Tir 1403) with Khamenei’s endorsement. Pezeshkian was known for his criticism of crackdowns on women regarding hijab, his positive outlook on secular Islam, and most notably, his desire to improve relations with the West and the United States. Unlike Ebrahim Raisi, he did not strongly advocate for the Quds Force’s foreign military operations.

Khamenei hoped that his support for Pezeshkian’s election would be perceived—especially by the Iranian middle class and international audiences—as a sign of retreat from his previously uncompromising positions. His aim was to have critics and opponents at home and abroad accept the Islamic Republic in its current state and to end hostilities. Ironically, Khamenei began considering reforms that his adversaries had long claimed as their political goals . Like many autocratic rulers, reform did not stem from benevolence, but rather from the depletion of suppressive power and resistance. Khamenei sought to portray these reforms as acts of goodwill, not as concessions, and was determined to ensure that such steps would not be seen as defeat. He still desires that the Islamic Republic—a state known for its nonconformity and disregard for the rule of law—be accepted on the global stage as a legitimate, rule-based political system.

The vigilant eyes of Israel’s security and intelligence apparatus were closely monitoring the internal situation and international relations of the Islamic Republic. Israel is well aware that if the Islamic Republic endures, its own existence will face serious threats. Based on the retreats and conciliatory positions of Khamenei, it had concluded that the Islamic Republic was in a weakened position and that, if confronted with a comprehensive attack, it would lose control of the country. In such a scenario, the discontented populace would swiftly take to the streets, leading to the regime’s collapse. 

It appears that Israeli analysts support the idea of facilitating a form of ‘color revolution’ or Velvet revolution   in Iran—similar to those that occurred in former Soviet republics. Among the opposition groups, the monarchist faction led by Reza Pahlavi is seen as the most aligned with this approach. Notably, this group maintains close ties with Israel and American neoconservatives and receives extensive financial, cyber, and political support from them.

 Many Iranian political activists working in the Persian divisions of Voice of America, Radio Farda, and American think tanks are strongly right-leaning, opposed to leftist or justice-oriented ideologies, and influenced by American neoconservative thought. Given that Reza Pahlavi is perceived as someone who would readily implement U.S. and Israeli policies in post-Islamic Republic Iran, he is considered the preferred choice of both countries. Consequently, American think tanks—many of which are financially dependent on the U.S. and Israeli governments—have, regardless of their individual perspectives, effectively become advocates for Reza Pahlavi. 

This group of intellectuals places significant emphasis on the role of the middle and affluent classes, as well as youth active on social media, in the struggle against the Islamic Republic. However, having a large following on social media in a country like Iran does not necessarily translate into real-world support. For instance, while one of Reza Pahlavi’s online calls to action on Twitter may receive up to 400,000 clicks, when he issues a political call for public mobilization, he struggles to gather even a few thousand people. This discrepancy suggests that the numerous followers and endorsements from monarchist celebrities and supporters of Reza Pahlavi are largely virtual and not reflective of genuine grassroots backing.  

Some time ago, a former spokesperson for the Israeli military stated in an interview with CNN that Behnam Taleblu and Saeed Ghasemi Nejad—members of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), led by Mark Dubowitz (who facilitated Reza Pahlavi’s visit to Israel)—provided a list and location details of sensitive sites and infrastructure in Iran for potential bombing.

It should not be forgotten that Saeed Ghasemi Nejad is a close advisor and a member of Reza Pahlavi’s inner circle. Political activists in the Iranian opposition are well aware that monarchist analysts and individuals close to Reza Pahlavi believe that the vast majority of the Iranian people are dissatisfied with the regime and are merely waiting for the regime’s repressive apparatus to be weakened by an external attack. In such a hypothetical situation, they believe that people would launch strikes, protests, and attacks on security, police, and military centers, ultimately leading to the overthrow of the regime.

It appears that Reza Pahlavi’s advisors, Iranian figures active in American think tanks, Iranian members of Donald Trump’s advisory board, and American politicians have influenced Benjamin Netanyahu with the belief that a military strike, assassination, and sabotage in Iran would quickly unravel the regime’s control, leading to its rapid collapse. It should also be noted that Reza Pahlavi’s political activities intensified during the two-week war between Israel and Iran, and his recurring message was that he would soon return to Iran, presenting himself in interviews and public appearances as someone poised to assume political power.

Considering Khamenei’s retreat after witnessing Israel’s firepower in eliminating and assassinating I.R. military leaders, Ismail Haniyeh’s presence in Tehran, the suspicious death of Ebrahim Raisi, and the destruction of IRGC gathering centers in Syria—alongside the insistence of analysts close to Reza Pahlavi that the Iranian people are fully prepared to rise up against the regime—and with Donald Trump’s return to power in the U.S. and his preference for avoiding military conflict in the Middle East while initiating negotiations with the I.R., all these factors prompted Netanyahu to act militarily before the regime could buy time, acquire nuclear weapons, or secure its political survival through talks with Trump.

It can be stated with certainty that in the early hours of Friday, June 13, 2025 (23 Khordad 1404), at approximately 3:20 AM local time, Israel launched an attack on Iran with the aim of overthrowing the Islamic Republic.

According to reliable reports, the initial wave of attacks was carried out by an internal network of Mossad agents and operatives — reportedly consisting of members of separatist Kurdish groups, disaffected Iranians, regime-change advocates, and supporters of Reza Pahlavi — under the leadership of several Mossad officers. This phase began with the deployment of dozens, possibly hundreds, of quadcopters targeting the residences of senior military officials, nuclear personnel, air defense facilities, and even certain missile launch platforms. Merely two to three hours into the operation — which also included infiltration into the cyber-communication networks of political and military leaders — Iranian airspace had effectively been secured for Israeli fighter jets. Only then did the Israeli Air Force intervene and begin striking its designated targets

The operation continued with the assassination of around 30 senior military, security, and nuclear figures, followed by rapid strikes on border posts in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Within the first few hours, Israel targeted Tabriz 20 times, resulting in the deaths of approximately 18 individuals. The attacks on Tabriz and the border regions of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan suggest that Israel may have intended to inflame ethnic and racial tensions in these volatile areas and bolster its affiliated political-ethnic proxy groups in next steps if Iranians themselves not start to overthrow IRI

In the days that followed, Israel intensified its aerial bombardment across cities and various regions of the country. The Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, also utilized its operatives inside Iran to coordinate the use of drones for explosions and assassinations. Despite the Islamic Republic’s retaliatory strikes using cruise and later ballistic missiles that caused significant destruction in Israeli cities such as Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Beersheba, Israel’s attacks  on Iran were described as humiliating, devastating, and painful. Two days after the initial assault, the airspace over Khamenei’s province was completely overtaken by the Israeli Air Force, whose fighter jets—whether firing from Azerbaijani airspace, Gulf countries, or flying directly over Iran—were able to strike any target with ease.

Although, out of national pride, it is often claimed that Israel failed in toppling the Islamic Republic, but it can be stated with confidence that Netanyahu emerged as the clear victor in the 12-day war in terms of intelligence, military, and security operations, achieving nearly all of his military objectives. Iran’s missile strikes on Israel resulted in approximately 30 deaths, thousands of injuries, and significant destruction; however, there were no confirmed reports of any Israeli political or military leaders being killed as a result of these attacks. Israel managed to push the Islamic Republic to the brink of collapse

Looking back on those terrifying days and recalling the scale and firepower of Israel’s military and security forces within Iran, it can be stated that Prime Minister Netanyahu’s belief—that millions of dissatisfied Iranians were merely waiting for a foreign attack to overthrow the Islamic Republic—was fundamentally flawed. Although the urban middle class and modern, affluent segments of society were deeply discontented, they were not revolutionary forces . Israel and its allied opposition groups made a grave miscalculation by relying on these demographics.

It should not be forgotten that during the peak of reciprocal attacks between the Islamic Republic and Israel, the majority of Tehran’s population—especially the middle and upper classes—ignored the regime’s call for defense and disregarded appeals from Reza Pahlavi and monarchists to mobilize against the regime. Instead, many chose to flee the conflict by vacationing along the Caspian Sea, effectively adopting a neutral stance that benefited the Islamic Republic. One of Reza Pahlavi’s advisors, named Kangarloo, publicly insulted and berated those leaving Tehran in a harsh and offensive tone during an interview.

In contrast, the defenders of the Islamic Republic during the war resembled patterns seen in fascist regimes: they were traditional and politically conservative segments of society. As consistently noted in analyses, these groups defended the regime to the last drop and, especially when facing a foreign aggressor, influenced other social classes to adopt a form of passive neutrality that ultimately favored the regime.

A point that has been repeatedly emphasized is that Iran’s middle and affluent classes lack the capacity to play a significant  role for toppling IRI . Any reliance on them for regime change is a fundamental error. This insight formed the core of Israel’s and the monarchists’ failure to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

There is no doubt that Israel’s claim of having disabled the Islamic Republic’s air defense system during last October’s aerial attacks is accurate. The vulnerability of Iranian airspace, which failed to prevent the incursion of Israeli fighter jets, confirms the validity of this assertion. The Islamic Republic was even incapable of protecting the lives of its senior military, security, and law enforcement commanders. Despite all the rhetoric, the Islamic Republic fundamentally lacked an effective air force to defend itself and its people.

Russia’s Mysterious Role in These Conflicts

Let us not forget that President Putin is eager for acceptance by the West. Russia, both before and after soviet union  collapse, has long sought integration with Europe and the United States, particularly in the fields of microchip imports, information technology, and advanced technical services. Russia is occasionally willing to engage in deals with the West to fulfill these aspirations.

It should also be remembered that throughout the Islamic Republic’s presence in Syria and during the bombardment of Quds Force positions by Israel, Russia’s S-400 missiles offered no tangible defense for the Islamic Republic against Israeli attacks.

One of the significant outcomes of this war ( Although the conflict has not yet fully concluded, a renewed Israeli offensive could resume at any moment)was the clear revelation that the monarchists, led by Reza Pahlavi, not only failed to condemn the military assault on Iranian soil but also offered a weak and faltering defense of it. This demonstrated that the political faction in question is willing to endorse a foreign military attack on Iran if it serves their own path to power.

On the other hand, it became evident that the ruling fundamentalist forces, despite having held power for 46 years, have been incapable of providing any meaningful defense for the people or the country, while engaging in boastful rhetoric. This two-week conflict effectively discredited both the ruling fundamentalist faction and the monarchist opposition to the Islamic Republic.

Donald Trump, who had consistently pledged that under his leadership the United States would not engage in any wars, unexpectedly made a statement following a series of escalating events. Despite having called for regime change in Iran as part of an initiative called “MIGA”(Make Iran great again ) on Monday, July 23, 2025 (Tir 4, 1404), and just days after Iran’s nuclear sites in Qom, Natanz, and Isfahan were targeted by heavy bunker-buster bombs, the situation intensified further when 14 Iranian missiles struck the American al-Udeid base in Qatar within hours. Shortly thereafter, Trump announced that the Islamic Republic and Israel had agreed to a ceasefire, with implementation set to begin imminently.

It appears that unless there is a significant shift in the balance of power and regional dynamics between Israel, the Islamic Republic, and the United States—both locally and globally—none of the parties are inclined to initiate another war. However, tensions, targeted assassinations, and ineffective sabotage efforts by Israel inside Iran are likely to persist. The Islamic Republic, lacking the operational capacity to mount serious retaliatory action, is unlikely to launch any significant response against either Israel or the United States.

Netanyahu may be willing to accept the risk of further missile attacks on Israel in order to launch new assaults against Iran. His strategy could involve waiting for larger waves of public protest within Iran, while simultaneously weakening the regime of the Ayatollahs through targeted assassinations of military and political commanders. Such operations could be repeated multiple times. However, it can be said with confidence that these attacks would only result in the erosion of central authority in Iran.

Israel may succeed in stirring separatist movements in Iranian Kurdistan or even provoking pan-Turkic sentiments in Azerbaijan. Yet, such developments would most likely plunge Iran into civil war and territorial fragmentation. Under no circumstances would Israel be able to restore Reza Pahlavi as the leader of a unified and cohesive Iranian state.

Netanyahu may succeed in devastating Iran or pushing it toward fragmentation. He might even be able to encourage his allied Kurdish organizations to pursue separatism. Although Netanyahu is an experienced politician within his own country, he knows virtually nothing about Iran. His aspiration to gain influence over Iran by installing a puppet government led by Reza Pahlavi is destined for a serious failure.

Through a campaign of assassinations, sabotage, and military strikes, Israel is not paving the way for an allied, stable Iran. Rather, it risks creating a shattered nation — one too fractured even to serve as a reliable ally.

Ayatollah Khamenei continues to dream of sparking an intifada within Israel or inspiring an anti-Zionist revolution across Arab nations—a dream that may well go unrealized. Meanwhile, the Middle East remains a volatile, simmering volcano. The region is not expected to settle into calm any time soon, and new alliances and rivalries may emerge from the ongoing unrest.

But what will Trump do? President Trump’s inclination is clearly to prevent the outbreak of war. He is deeply concerned about the risk of a broader conflict erupting in the strategically vital Persian Gulf region. Likewise, Khamenei, fearing the possible destruction of the Islamic Republic, also seeks de-escalation. Netanyahu may speak boldly and make frequent threats, but it should not be forgotten that he was quick to agree to the ceasefire proposal put forth by President Trump.

It appears that as long as the balance of power — which led to the ceasefire — does not shift significantly in favor of either side, none of these actors are eager to provoke further tensions or initiate a renewed round of conflict.

Approximately two months prior to Israel’s assault on Iran, and at the onset of negotiations between the Islamic Republic and the United States mediated by Oman, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Iran would be given a 60-day window to reach a definitive outcome through diplomacy. It was clear that Ayatollah Khamenei’s objective in entering these negotiations was to stall for time—an approach consistent with the Islamic Republic’s four decades of tactic-driven governance based on delay and distraction.

The American diplomatic apparatus was fully aware of this pattern and responded by escalating threats of a possible military strike, aimed at pressuring the Islamic Republic to abandon its time-buying strategy. In this tense environment, Israel launched a comprehensive military offensive against Islamic Republic positions on July 13, 2025 (Khordad 23, 1404), targeting and eliminating key military commanders. The scale and surprise of the attack shocked the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the leadership, and the Iranian population.

Some have embraced conspiracy theories, arguing that the U.S.–Iran negotiations served only to buy time for Israel’s planned assault. Supporters and officials of the Islamic Republic, perhaps seeking to mask their diplomatic shortcomings—namely, their failure to secure even a temporary understanding with a hesitant Trump—have leaned into these theories to deflect responsibility for the devastating consequences.

Yet, Trump’s reluctance to authorize a military strike on Iran appears to have been genuine. As in previous moments, the Islamic regime failed to seize the diplomatic opportunity. Its insistence on continuing uranium enrichment, despite the warning signs, opened the door to more aggressive advocacy for a military solution.

America’s proposal for a ceasefire and Israel’s subsequent agreement appear to have been influenced by several key factors:

The middle and affluent classes exhibited passive support for preserving the regime. Public sentiment largely condemned the assault, despite widespread recognition of the Islamic Republic’s own provocations over four decades, which centered on antagonistic policies targeting Israel.

In retaliation, Iran’s missile system managed to deliver significant blows to Israeli residential areas, security installations, and research centers. Roughly 10% of the missiles reached their intended targets, sparking considerable fear and destruction within Israel. . Nevertheless, the continuation of Iranian missile attacks could have spread panic within Israel, and the Israeli military — which has maintained a record of decisive victories in nearly every conflict over the past fifty years — was unwilling to accept even a tactical defeat of that magnitude. Prime Minister Netanyahu had hoped for a swift and definitive collapse of the Islamic Republic via surprise strikes—yet underestimated the scale and capacity of Iran’s missile response.

Following Iran’s missile attack on the U.S. military base in Qatar, Trump grew alarmed by the possibility of full-scale war—a scenario that could have triggered the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and widespread fires in regional oil fields. This prompted his call for an immediate ceasefire.

The Islamic Republic’s limited counteroffensive—amid Israel’s crushing military, intelligence, and security blows—may have been just enough to save it from collapse, a fate that could have led to internal chaos, civil war, and increased foreign intervention. In essence, Trump appeared to choose the path of preventing Iran’s descent into disorder and turmoil, possible civil war , chaos in Persian golf and high prices for oil and gas and fuel in USA .

It must not be forgotten that both factions—the monarchists, and on the other side, Khamenei and the Hezbollah-aligned forces—were willing to push the country to the brink of destruction: one in pursuit of power, the other in desperation to maintain it.

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