The Israeli strike on Iran’s military and intelligence infrastructure on June 13, 2025, marked more than a military episode — it may well be remembered as a defining turning point in the Islamic Republic’s turbulent history. Its significance lies not just in its force, but in the way it disrupted a sophisticated political manoeuvre by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the final act of his long rule.
In a bid to preserve the regime, Khamenei had embarked on an extraordinary political experiment — attempting to play three historical roles at once: accepting crisis like Gorbachev, managing a transition like Yeltsin, and restoring authoritarian stability from above like Putin. But today’s Iran is no longer a system where such a plan can succeed — at least not without the unpredictable factor of a growing Third Force within society. At the same time, another critical variable must not be overlooked — the prospect of foreign military intervention, which could upend the entire playing field and disrupt the plans of all domestic actors, from Khamenei himself to the independent forces emerging from within the people.
Tactical Retreats from the Top
In recent years, Khamenei appears to have grasped a painful truth: the Islamic Republic cannot weather massive internal and external shocks without some degree of adaptability. Military setbacks in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, the infiltration of Iranian intelligence by Israeli operatives, and the nationwide uprising of 2022 led the regime to pivot from totalitarianism to crisis containment.
The death of President Raisi in early 2024 dismantled a key pillar of Khamenei’s “homogeneous government” project. Then came an unusual move: allowing Masoud Pezeshkian, a perceived moderate, to win the 2024 presidential election — not out of belief in reform, but as a tactical move to buy time and appease Iran’s restive middle class and reformists.
But the ruse didn’t last long. Pezeshkian was quickly unmasked as neither a true reformist nor an independent actor. At best, he was a technocratic figure straddling fundamentalism and reformism — and ultimately, a polite puppet of the Supreme Leader. Yet the system’s loyalists, the moderate middle class, and the apolitical gray zone of society, reluctantly went along with it.
Israel’s Strike: The End of the “Controlled Reform” Illusion?
The Israeli operation — limited in scope but deep in psychological and strategic impact — shattered the regime’s internal equilibrium. Netanyahu appears to have understood Khamenei’s survival strategy: gradual retreat, temporary liberalization, and engagement with the West to avoid collapse. So he chose to strike where it hurt — disrupting the Islamic Republic’s top-down plan for engineered reform.
With this, Israel may have undermined any chance for Tehran to extract political leverage from secret talks with the U.S., whether under Biden or a future Trump administration. Netanyahu, it seems, isn’t just betting on monarchist exiles — he is wagering on the regime’s collapse by unsettling its fragile internal balance.
The Rise of a Third Force — And a New Political Imagination?
But the real story may be taking shape elsewhere.
In this precarious landscape, neither the old-school reformists nor the exiled monarchists have been able to assert cultural or political dominance over Iran’s public discourse. Instead, a Third Force is quietly emerging — one without a flag, but with growing resonance.
This new force does not draw from the existing power structure, nor does it long for the return of the pre-revolutionary monarchy. It is a grassroots, decentralized movement composed of:
A new, urban, semi-modern generation that distrusts all traditional institutions
Women and youth hardened and politicized by the 2022 protests
Teachers, workers, and the urban poor who seek neither reform nor royal restoration
Ethnic and religious minorities, increasingly disillusioned with Tehran’s centralism — though their participation brings demands for autonomy, and in some cases, visions of a federal Iran
This force lacks a formal leadership, but it has gained cultural and psychological dominance — in the virtual realm, in street-level discourse, and in the hearts of Iran’s disillusioned middle class. No centralized political project — from inside or outside the system — can survive today without the engagement or consent of this force.
Khamenei still clings to a long-standing hope — one that stretches back to the very birth of the Islamic Revolution — of sparking a broader uprising with an Islamic and anti-Western identity across the Middle East and North Africa as a means to rescue his own revolution. However, the Muslim Brotherhood — a rival and adversary of the Islamic Republic — lies in wait, ready to hijack any such movement for its own purposes. In reality, only one scenario could possibly offer Khamenei a lifeline too : a large-scale intifada erupting within the Palestinian territories and Israel — a prospect that appears increasingly unlikely.
Three Scenarios in the Wake of the Israeli Strike
1. Accelerated Collapse
Continued Israeli pressure, tightened sanctions, and internal chaos could lead to a breakdown of central authority
Risks include civil war, foreign intervention, and territorial instability
If the Third Force remains disorganized, it may be sidelined or crushed in the fallout
2. Top-Down Restoration of Legitimacy
Under mounting pressure, Khamenei could allow relatively freer elections, a symbolic return of someone like Khatami, or even a limited referendum
The Third Force might engage — but only if genuine political freedoms are granted
3. Externally Engineered Regime Change
In this case, exiled opposition groups, the U.S., and Israel impose a post-Islamic Republic regime from above
This path poses the highest risks of instability, renewed authoritarianism, and the sidelining of domestic independent actors
Final Thought: The Future Belongs to Society — Not to the War Room or the Supreme Leader’s Circle
Khamenei may have hoped to be remembered as a unique fusion of Gorbachev the reformer, Yeltsin the disruptor, and Putin the consolidator. But the Iranian people are unlikely to grant him that legacy — unless he takes the greatest political gamble of his life: voluntarily ceding part of his power to the people.
If he fails to do so, history may remember him not as a reformer, but as a desperate Yeltsin — or worse, as an isolated and fallen autocrat like Saddam.
In this historic crossroads, Iran’s Third Force — an independent civil society, women, youth, and the silent but awakened majority — is the decisive actor. The future of Iran will not be shaped in military compounds or exile palaces, but in the streets, minds, and imaginations of its people.
کاوه فرزند ملت 
Leave a Reply