“The enemy always enters from the very place you’ve mistaken for the home of a friend.”
In recent years, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have consistently warned of Zionist infiltration into Iran’s security, nuclear, and military infrastructure. A string of assassinations of nuclear scientists, sophisticated sabotage operations at Natanz and Karaj facilities, and the exposure of classified IRGC data have all been attributed to Mossad. But the fundamental question remains:
How has one of the most closed and repressive security regimes in the world become so vulnerable to Mossad infiltration?
How is it that a regime infamous for its police-state architecture has, even after more than a decade of shocking assassinations, sabotage, espionage, and even truckloads of stolen documents, failed to detect and eliminate this penetration from within the IRGC and nuclear facilities?
The answer may lie in a place more unexpected than previously imagined: inside the rooms of Russian advisors in the heart of Tehran.
According to an investigative report recently published in Persian translation on the “Kaveh Farzand-e Mellat” website (originally from The Insider), Iran has effectively become the new center of Russian intelligence operations in the Middle East. This is no mere allegation. The frequent flights of key Russian military intelligence figures—such as General Sergey Afanasyev and Andrey Averyanov—to Tehran provide tangible evidence of this geopolitical shift. (Averyanov is known for overseeing sabotage operations in Europe and for his unit’s use of the Novichok nerve agent against Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in 2017 in Salisbury, UK.)
The Insider report highlights how three main Russian intelligence agencies, operating in full coordination, have gained effective access to Iran’s drone production centers, nuclear facilities, and even air defense systems. These agencies have established a presence not only in Tehran but across other parts of the country. The report even names operatives like “Colonel Igor Dyomkin,” stationed in Tehran under the guise of a scientific advisor, who freely travels between Tehran and Hamedan—likely the Shahrokhi Air Base. This route could serve as a corridor for transporting data, equipment, or even covert agents.
Part of this seemingly military collaboration—including the exchange of kamikaze drones for raw gold bars—has provided cover for constructing clandestine espionage infrastructure inside Iran. Payam Airport, Amirabad Port, and military zones in Hamedan have gradually turned into bustling bases for Russian operatives.
But this is more than just a military exchange. In intelligence operations, any foreign presence is potentially a leak point—whether through direct infiltration, identifying vulnerabilities, or trading information with third parties.
When Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated with astonishing precision, or when the personal information of dozens of IRGC members appeared in Hebrew-language media, it suggested that Mossad no longer needs to operate from Israeli or Azerbaijani soil. All it takes is for one of the Russian advisory centers—knowingly or unknowingly—to create a small breach in Tehran’s security wall. All it takes is one Russian intelligence officer, under pressure or bribed by Mossad, to hand over sensitive information, after which regaining control becomes extremely difficult.
Can we truly believe that Russia—a country that has made tactical arrangements with Israel in Syria and frequently coordinated military operations with Tel Aviv—is a reliable ally of the Islamic Republic in resisting Israel? Or is Russia’s presence in Iran actually part of a much broader intelligence game?
Russia’s loyalty to Iran is not rooted in principles but, like any other country, in cold, hard interests. Yet the Islamic Republic, relying on a delusional, outdated ideological discourse, considers Russia and China to be part of an anti-Western alliance it calls the “Axis of Resistance.” According to this logic, member states of this axis—including the Islamic Republic, which views itself as a leader—are supposedly obligated to defend one another against the so-called aggressive West. Therefore, Russia would never, the thinking goes, sell Iran’s secrets to Israel.In reality, no such alliance exists.
The ideological rigidity in the minds of Iran’s Supreme Leader and other senior officials has caused a kind of intellectual paralysis. Yet they still expect Russia to treat them like a “brother country”—while simultaneously wanting closer ties with Europe and the U.S.
Russia and China may pursue relations with the West for themselves, but they never grant the same privileges to a dependent country desperate for military and security assistance.
The Islamic Republic knows that acknowledging or even questioning the possibility of Russian intelligence leaks to Israel would discredit its cherished “resistance discourse.” And the Supreme Leader lacks the courage to admit the isolation of his revolutionary regime.
So the regime prefers not to confront Russia, just as it never protested Moscow’s inaction in defending the IRGC in Syria.
Throughout the Ukraine war, Russia repeatedly leveraged Iran for weapons and sanctions evasion, but didn’t hesitate to bolster Israel in order to preserve regional balance.
Thus, Russia’s ongoing military and intelligence presence in Iran not only reflects strategic dependency but effectively opens the “back door” for hostile infiltration—most notably by Mossad.
On October 1, 2022, a delegation led by General Sergey Afanasyev, deputy chief of Russia’s military intelligence (GRU), arrived in Tehran. It was Afanasyev’s first visit, but he has returned every few months since.
He was accompanied by General Andrey Averyanov, the notorious head of Unit 29155—infamous for his role in operations such as the Skripal poisoning, explosions in Czech and Bulgarian arms depots, and microwave weapon attacks against U.S. diplomats.
Interestingly, during the same period of Averyanov’s visit, Iran experienced a wave of chemical attacks on girls’ schools that persisted for months. The possibility of a link between this delegation’s trip and the gas poisonings deserves serious investigation. If this pattern was tested as a method of suppressing civil unrest, the Islamic Republic may, in the future, face blackmail by Russia over this covert collaboration.
One key question remains:
Why hasn’t the Islamic Republic investigated the possible role of Russia in these intelligence breaches?
Between 2011 and 2024, IRGC Quds Force gatherings in Syria were regularly bombed by Israeli airstrikes, causing heavy casualties. Even though Syria’s skies were covered by Russian S-300 and S-400 missile systems, not once did the Islamic Republic dare protest Russia’s failure to defend its forces.
This military-security relationship resembles a master–vassal dynamic, where the subordinate side dares not question the dominant one. It is even plausible that the Islamic Republic has suspicions or evidence of Russian collusion with Mossad, but refrains from confronting it out of fear of losing military support.
If the Islamic Republic is genuinely committed to “countering Mossad infiltration,” it must abandon its sanctification of Kremlin relations and conduct an independent security assessment of Russia’s presence in the country.
Expelling Russian military-intelligence advisors—or at the very least, imposing serious restrictions on their activities—is the first step toward sealing one of the many security holes through which sensitive national and military data has been leaked.
As long as the Russian intelligence command centers remain operational in Tehran, Mossad infiltration will not stop.
“The enemy always enters from the very place you’ve mistaken for the home of a friend.”
کاوه فرزند ملت 
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