The Islamic Revolution will melt away in the face of modern civilization
The 1979 Islamic Revolution promised to liberate Iran from Western domination and to build a self-sufficient, religious state. More than four decades later, however, its ideology appears increasingly brittle in the face of modern civilization, global interconnection, and the aspirations of Iran’s own people. While the regime still relies on repression, propaganda, and geopolitical confrontation to survive, the cultural and intellectual gravity of the West continues to shape the imagination of Iranians inside and outside the country. This tension between an authoritarian past and a modernizing future defines Iran’s current moment — a moment in which the collapse of revolutionary illusions seems inevitable.
In this article, several key terms will first be explained, followed by an introduction. Subsequently, the emergence of the phenomenon known as the Islamic Revolution will be analyzed, along with its characteristics and defining attributes. Historical examples of similar ideological movements, their social manifestations, their ultimate outcomes, and finally, the conclusions drawn will be discussed.”
First, let us present our interpretation and understanding of ‘modern civilization’ and the ‘Islamic Revolution.’
Regarding the ‘Islamic Revolution’: It would have been more appropriate to use the term ‘Islamic civilization’ in contrast to ‘modern civilization.’ However, given that the so-called Islamic civilization encompasses thousands of sects, religions, and doctrines, and has numerous heirs—including figures such as “ Vali-ye Faqih[1], in Iran , the Kings of Morocco and Jordan, the Caliphs and Mamluks governing Saudi Arabia, Mullah Hibatullah, and the leaders of ISIS—all of whom claim to be the rightful inheritors of this civilization and the true leaders of the global Muslim community, we will limit the scope of our research in this article. Our focus will be specifically on the Islamic Revolution of Shi’ian-e Velayi[2], currently led by Khamenei and confined within Iran. This fundamentalist group has successfully established a government within a defined political geography and taken control of state affairs.
With considerable leniency, one could refer to what Khamenei calls ‘Islamic civilization’ and himself as its leader as the ‘Islamic Revolution discourse.’ This rhetoric has existed for five decades, exploiting the revolution that initially emerged during the Constitutional Movement to establish the rule of law in Iran and later took on an anti-monarchical stance in 1979. It has continuously fed off that revolution, gradually draining its energy and vitality.
The leaders of the Islamic Revolution discourse consist of two factions: reformists and conservatives. Neither faction has contributed to intellectual or ideological advancements that could foster Iran’s progress in various economic, political, and social domains. For 120 years, the Iranian people and their ongoing revolution have strived to pull these figures out of the depths of frozen Arab traditions and educate them, only to face fierce resistance from religious traditionalists.
Although it must be acknowledged that the Shiite religious leaders 3, over more than a century since the Constitutional Movement, has—albeit not out of free will or foresight, but under compulsion—yielded to modernization (though not to modernity), and despite producing eclectic and superficial forms of modern institutions, it has nonetheless played a significant role in the expansion of modern structures such as universities, bureaucracies, and infrastructure, as well as in the mass spread of capitalism. However, all of this has occurred not because of the clergy’s4 consent, but in spite of their will.
Toay, nearly a century after the Constitutional Revolution, 1905, the fortress of clerical reaction is crumbling under the relentless assault of modern thought. The clergy, in enforcing religious rulings, increasingly rely on secular laws to lend their judgments an air of rational legitimacy, while the once-celebrated views of clerical figures like Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri are now considered an affront to Islam. It is difficult to believe that just seventy years ago, the outspoken Shiite clergy opposed essential aspects of modern life—such as showers, pharmacies, railroads, schools, women’s education, and equal legal rights for all citizens .
The gradual retreat of reactionary Islamic-Shiite traditions requires a decisive political revolution to reach a definitive outcome—ultimately eliminating clerical influence from governance. 3
In Iran , a continuous revolution is underway, If we were to use the language of metaphor and symbolism similar to French Revolution and France between the years 1789 and 1945,where the Red and the Black “were in struggle against each other.
In today’s Iran, the dominant forces can be described as representatives of “the Black” and historical reaction—namely, the Shia clergy led by Ali Khamenei and the remnants of the monarchy. The former holds power over the political, economic, and social spheres, while the latter—the monarchist remnants—maintain a degree of hegemony over parts of the middle and affluent classes and receive support from segments of international actors involved in Iranian affairs, particularly Israel and the United States..
In other word , the Iranian revolution is confronted by two counter-revolutionary forces, while the Red represents the forces advocating for democracy,liberalism, and the goals of the modern world . Let us not forget that in today’s Iran, in order to achieve liberal ideals that are easily accessible to all in other countries, one must engage in a political revolution, The goal of the revolution in Iran is not socialism or a leftist political structure, but the pursuit of a form of red liberalism.
Indeed, there were times when we, the people of Iran, had to endure the condemnation and curses of religious clerics simply for attending school, using showers and pharmacies, pursuing women’s education, or building schools. However, rather than engaging in self-reflection or acknowledging their resistance to modernity and societal progress until the very last moment, the clerics typically adopt a stance of entitlement toward modernity and intellectuals. They have continuously harassed, arrested, and persecuted them in various ways, while also inciting the most reactionary segments of society in Iran and the region against them.
The sole claim made by supporters of the Islamic Revolution is that they have managed to preserve Iran’s geopolitical framework over the four decades they have held power. However, the fundamental issue is that, thus far, maintaining the Islamic government has been contingent upon defending Iran. Given the ideological orientation of Hezbollah-affiliated groups, it is evident that if the preservation of the Islamic government were ever to come into conflict with safeguarding Iran, they would prioritize the survival of the government—even at the expense of Iran itself—just as they have, by their own admission, sacrificed their faith, their religious beliefs, and even their devotion to their Imam.
Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, it was historical traditionalism that, in the realm of politics, resisted Iran’s modernization in various ways. In 1979, the people, with the assistance and leadership of Khomeini , overthrew the monarchy. In doing so, one faction of traditionalists and conservatives—the clergy—was positioned against the monarchy, ultimately leading to the monarchy’s elimination at the hands of the religious establishment
This term that uses as “clergy” in Englis is generally refers to religious leadership, particularly within Iranian Shi’a Muslim traditions, encompassing scholars and clerics who guide religious practices and beliefs. Depending on the context, it may also denote the broader concept of spiritual devotion and And particularly over the past 200 years, it refers to religious, political, and social leadership
From the very next day after the religious leadership came to power in 1979, a fierce struggle began to eliminate this part of political traditionalism and social conservatism—a struggle that has continued to this day. This force can be called the “Third Force” or the “People’s Force”—a movement that, inspired by the French Revolution, entered the political stage in Iran after the Constitutional Revolution of 1905.
Modern Civilization:
If we regard the defining feature of modern civilization as the emancipation of individuals from subservience to divine authorities, then this civilization stands in direct opposition to the religious culture that underpins the discourse of the Islamic Revolution. This culture, at its core, promotes a social structure in which individuals require a “master,” a “religious authority,” or a “visionary leader.” In Velayai Iran, even the most reform-minded figures refer to Khamenei with the honorific title “His Excellency.”
Signifying that reformists themselves represent another dimension of the Islamic revolutionary discourse. They believe that this religiously centered political structure is the force that will ultimately rescue Iran from its various economic, political, and social crises.
5 Iran-e Velayi refers to an ideological perspective that emphasizes Iran’s commitment to Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Shias clergies ) as the foundation of its political and religious governance. It signifies a system where Islamic principles, particularly Shi’a jurisprudence, shape the country’s leadership and policies
Which Forces Can Challenge the Islamic Republic
Politics as a Tool of Social Dynamics:
Politics serves as a mechanism for understanding balance, equilibrium, and the interaction of social forces. Anyone claiming that the revolution and the Islamic Republic have collapsed in the face of modern civilization must substantiate their argument by demonstrating that advocates of modern political and social thought can mobilize forces with irreconcilable opposition to the supporters of the Islamic Republic—forces that, through open confrontation, engage in a struggle aimed at their eradication, contingent upon the presentation of a superior model for governing Iran.
If we are to discuss this matter in earthly terms rather than in an abstract, cosmic space, we must ask: Which political forces are capable of carrying the banner of such a struggle? Even outlining and presenting such a theory is neither simple nor easily achievable. One could resort to superficial claims often propagated by opposition activists, such as portraying the Islamic Republic as synonymous with darkness and backwardness, while equating modernity and the West with progress and advancement—concluding that, by the decree of history, modern civilization will inevitably triumph over Islamic civilization.
However, such arguments resemble commonplace rhetoric that is occasionally put forth. No force collapses merely by the dictates of history; rather, history is a battleground for competing forces. Alongside historical necessity, the rise or decline of a social force is influenced by dozens, even hundreds, of additional factors.
Assertions suggesting that the Islamic Republic is destined to collapse based on historical inevitability hold as much weight as stating that the sun will rise in the east tomorrow—such claims are generalizations devoid of analytical value. In today’s context, such statements and their proponents merit little attention.
Numerous non-democratic governments have remained in power for decades, even centuries, and various regressive forces have successfully retained control over political structures for extended periods. In other words, a government does not necessarily fall simply because it is oppressive, backward, or traditionalist. For instance, the politically stagnant structures governing Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have maintained their grip on power for decades.
A meaningful analysis of Iran must demonstrate that revolutionary forces within the country—undoubtedly influenced by external factors—possess the capability to overthrow the Islamic Republic. It is also crucial to recognize that not every form of regime change necessarily leads to the establishment of a modern system. The type of transition that would facilitate Iran’s modernization across all aspects of social life would need to be led by democratic, liberal, and progressive forces.
On this basis, for example, the factions rallying around Reza Pahlavi cannot be considered modernist forces. A monarchist is just as regressive as an individual committed to clerical rule. If Reza Pahlavi were to return to power in Iran, the social and political forces surrounding him would inevitably lead to the restoration of monarchy. Given that monarchy in Iran has historically fostered an intensely unequal political system, it would certainly not result in a secular governance model—unless Reza Pahlavi fundamentally revises his political stance.
Secularism guarantees equal rights for all citizens under the law and serves as the backbone of a democratic political system. In Iran, both Royal court of monarchy and the “Beite Khamenei” (the same as Royal court in monarchy )of the Supreme Leader have consistently positioned themselves above the people in order to maintain their dominance.. Consequently, neither monarchy nor the Bayt-e Wilayat al-Faqih can be expected to establish or sustain a secular political system. The derogatory notions of “ratifying the people’s vote” or the “royal endorsement” of parliamentary decisions merely reflect a system wherein monarchs, clerics, and their supporters elevate themselves above the rest of the populace.
Is there a coherent theory can challenge the Islamic Republic to way for establish a progressive, democratic, and industrialized Iran?
If we are to speak in sociological terms, what social force has the capacity to uproot the Islamic Republic—a regime deeply embedded within the clerical establishment, with a legacy spanning over 2,000 years woven into the cultural life of this nation? Furthermore, what entity can simultaneously lay the groundwork for its demise by preparing the emergence of a viable successor?
Before introducing you, esteemed audience, to the force capable of dismantling this anachronistic regime—one that, like a grotesque burden, weighs heavily on the homeland, draining its lifeblood and depleting the strength of Iran and its people—it is essential first to examine a few historical examples relevant to this matter. Only then shall we return to the discussion of the Islamic Republic.
The only coherent theory that can aid in a precise analysis and understanding of the Islamic Republic is found in parts of the work of the late Dariush Shayegan. He viewed the October Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, and other mass uprisings of the modern era—including the 1979 Iranian Revolution—as ideological offspring of the French Revolution. He believed that the common thread among these revolutions is their critique of modernity, arising in response to the question, “What should be done with modernity?” and as attempts to address the fundamental problem of economic underdevelopment of their countries compared to the industrialized West.
According to this perspective, these revolutions were historically driven by the necessity of establishing capitalist systems in their respective countries. This historical imperative, emerging from the economic and social structures dominant in those societies, operated beyond the ambitions and intentions of the revolutionary leaders and imposed itself upon society, leadership, and ruling parties.
Thus, the key issue is not that, after the October Revolution in Russia, Stalin—a staunch Orthodox Communist—came to power. What matters is that the economic structure of Tsarist Russia existed within the broader sphere of global capitalism, and its underlying economic and social institutions required the establishment of capitalist frameworks for continued survival. This necessity dictated that, even within a politically anti-capitalist system, forces would emerge to transform the socialist empire into the oligarchic capitalist state that Russia is today.
Applying these Russian and Chinese models, the fact that the leaders of the 1979 Iranian Revolution were clerics hostile to modernity—or that the leaders of the Chinese Revolution were radical, anti-capitalist communists—is ultimately irrelevant. The continuous revolutionary momentum in Iran—starting from the Constitutional Movement 1905—and the underlying economic and social structures necessitate the eventual establishment of a capitalist system. This revolution, driven by these structural imperatives, will persist until it achieves its objectives, ultimately forcing its demands upon the leaders of the Islamic Revolution and removing them from their misplaced positions of leadership.
Unless the revolution, like a fetus in its mother’s womb, dies before birth as a result of an event such as a civil war, territorial disintegration, or foreign invasion.
The transformation of the Soviet Union into a capitalist Russia did not happen overnight.
Looking back at the tumultuous final years of the Soviet Union, one can clearly discern the gradual emergence of a middle class that harbored anti-socialist sentiments, embedded in the fabric of everyday Soviet life. This trend was already visible when General Zhukov—the conqueror of Berlin—returned from World War II with dozens of priceless paintings, artworks, antiques, and gold looted from the mansions of German millionaires. These items, worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, were taken into his private residence. Even Stalin was unable to reclaim them, and Beria’s warning—that such private possessions would mark the beginning of capitalism within the USSR—went unheeded.
Another early crack in the ideological edifice appeared when General Rybalko, a celebrated war hero, defiantly mocked the regime’s patriotic dogma by telling Stalin, “You may be a Soviet citizen, but you are not Russian—you speak Russian with a Georgian accent.” Later, under Andropov’s leadership, an investigation into the massive corruption surrounding the Univermag department stores revealed that a sprawling network of party officials controlled billions of dollars in unregistered assets: antiques, gold, and foreign currency. Andropov soon realized that jailing all the culprits would mean imprisoning over 50% of the regime’s officials. At that point, the collapse of the socialist order had already begun from within.
The deadlocks and contradictions that plagued the late Soviet system closely resemble the blind spots and stagnation we now witness in the Islamic Republic. Today, more than half of Iran’s officials are fundamentally alienated from the foundational ideals of the Islamic Revolution. Widespread embezzlement is not merely a symptom of dysfunction—it is an act of defiance. It marks a rebellion against the system, a quiet but systemic betrayal from within. The embezzlers and the true revolutionaries now find themselves on opposite sides of the same battlefield, but both are, in different ways, undermining the regime. One acts for personal gain, the other in pursuit of justice and public welfare. And yet both, as Victor Hugo aptly put it, “rise against the political order—one for personal gain, the other for the common good.”
This, precisely, is what led to the fall of the Soviet Union: internal contradictions and systemic decay. And these same forces will inevitably bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic. Its fate is sealed—its fall is only a matter of time.
In an era dominated by global capitalism, no political system can remain ideologically hostile to capitalism while also sustaining political legitimacy, economic development, and industrial progress. The choices are few and stark: one may dream of abolishing capitalism entirely—an impossible task—or attempt to engage it pragmatically and selectively, as China has done. Alternatively, a regime may choose isolation and resistance, like Cuba and North Korea, remaining poor, stagnant, and globally irrelevant. Or, as in the case of the Soviet Union, a systemic transformation may eventually take place.
But the Islamic Republic rejects this path. It not only refuses structural transformation; it lacks even the minimal institutional capacity to serve, attract, or coexist with global capital. And in the long run, no state can survive this contradiction.
Four Decades After the Islamic Revolution: Still Wandering in Search of Identity
More than forty years since its inception, the Islamic Republic remains fundamentally devoid of a coherent identity. It has lost its once-claimed revolutionary essence, stands in opposition to Iranian nationalism, and harbors deep-seated animosity toward much of the broader Islamic world—particularly the Sunni majority. In its place, it has constructed and aggressively promoted a narrow ideological framework centered on Shi‘ite Velayat-e Faqih.
In a desperate bid to forge a pan-Islamic identity, Ayatollah Khamenei has persistently sought to fan the flames of conflict between Palestinians and Israelis—an effort to symbolically insert the Islamic Republic into the heart of the Islamic world. Yet this strategy is intrinsically flawed. The ideological path the regime has chosen leaves it with no viable route forward other than perpetual confrontation with global capitalism—a struggle it is destined to lose.
Khamenei’s loyalists cling to illusions of salvation through emerging blocs such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and strategic alliances with Russia and China. They present these alignments as viable alternatives to the Western-led global order. But this is nothing more than a mirage. These platforms, while geopolitically relevant, do not offer the ideological or economic foundation necessary to legitimize or sustain a regime in existential decline.
No political or ideological system in modern history has successfully resisted modernity. The Islamic Republic will be no exception.
Contrast this with the trajectory of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Under Mao Zedong, the Gang of Four, and during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese system may have initially opposed capitalism, but out of that ideological crucible emerged a pragmatic economic model that not only survived global capitalist crises but also became a driving force of capitalist expansion.
Viewed from this lens, both Russian and Chinese socialism should be seen not as antitheses to capitalism, but as transitional, nationalist frameworks that facilitated its eventual rise. These systems helped construct the modern nation-state and industrial base required for capitalism to flourish, much like the legacy of the French Revolution did in Europe. The so-called “anti-capitalist” revolutions of Russia and China were, in fact, historical prerequisites for the capitalist transformation of their respective societies.
Similarly, despite its anti-capitalist rhetoric, the Islamic Republic is—unintentionally and paradoxically—accelerating Iran’s transformation into a secular, capitalist, and modern nation-state. The emergence of a nationalist middle class is an inevitable consequence of this process, even as the regime publicly denounces the very forces it is empowering behind the scenes.
This perspective also helps to explain how, over seven decades, figures like Yeltsin and Gorbachev—champions of capitalism—could emerge from within a nominally communist framework. Efforts by hardline defenders of socialism, such as Yuri Andropov or Lavrentiy Beria before him, ultimately failed to prevent the rise of bureaucrats who had become de facto capitalists. In post-Soviet Russia, the collapse of ideology opened the floodgates for oligarchy and neoliberalism.
A similar process is underway in China, though under strict institutional and legal oversight. In Iran, however, the regime’s failure to adapt or manage this historical transition suggests a more abrupt and potentially violent outcome: a popular revolution aimed at removing the clergy from political power.
One Islamic Republic supporter, attempting to inject philosophical reasoning into the debate, once argued that since Iran has already undergone two revolutions in the past century, a third is impossible—asserting an unwritten law of political physics. But this assertion is entirely unfounded. History offers no such guarantees.
“We shall alter the cycle of the seasons.”
A statement attributed to Stalin asserts: “If necessary to achieve our goal, we will even alter the cycle of the seasons.” Indeed, what led to the internal collapse of such a powerful political system? We all recognize that the Soviet system, once considered a global superpower—worthy of being regarded alongside the Seven Wonders of the World as an eighth—was internally challenged by its own governing elements and ultimately dismantled by its leaders, who had become absorbed into capitalist relations. What was the cause of this downfall? What immense force—akin to a nuclear explosion—was capable of destroying such a formidable system?
An assessment of the recent past:
The year is 1994—just three years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. I find myself amidst the remnants of an industrial settlement in one of Russia’s cities. The sound of birds and stray dogs echo through the abandoned factories and workshops, where only skeletal wooden and iron frames remain. It is profoundly unsettling.
Standing atop a high point, surveying the desolate landscape of plundered and ruined factories, a sense of dread overtakes me. The scene is reminiscent of the Mongol invasion of Iran’s flourishing cities, as depicted in historical accounts. That well-known phrase comes to mind: “They came, they burned, they destroyed, and they left.”
These workshops and factories were once vibrant, their machinery turning, sustaining the livelihoods of thousands—tens of thousands, even. What became of them? How is it that even doors, walls, and machinery were stripped away as scrap metal? If the Mongols had assaulted this civilization—the socialist civilization—they would not have obliterated it to such an extreme degree.
_”Woe to the vanquished…”_ What befell this civilization? What led to its downfall? Perhaps part of the answer lies in the fact that the Soviet Union, the political system born from socialist civilization, failed to resolve its ideological stance toward capitalism. Moreover, it lacked the ability to present a viable economic and social alternative.
Now, we understand that resisting capitalism altogether was never truly feasible. In the end, the Soviet Union established an economic structure based on surplus value. The gradual rise of the middle class—concealing its wealth—resulted in the formation of millions of unofficial petty bourgeois individuals, secretly accumulating unregistered billions beneath the surface of socialist relations.
Ultimately, this emerging social structure could no longer endure the political system misaligned with its own reality. The Soviet Union was dismantled so that these covert assets could integrate into the global economy—so that, as the saying goes, “wealth could be transformed into capital.” Additionally, the longstanding hostilities and conspiracies of the United States and Europe against Russia—as a non-Western superpower—further fueled the crisis.
The Chinese communists, in contrast, sought to avoid the Soviet experience. In the Soviet Union, communist party cadres gradually became internal adversaries of socialism. To prevent this, China entrusted economic affairs to party cadres and took measures to halt the gradual detachment of the middle class—formed through wealth redistribution—from party leadership.
Recognizing that survival required adaptation, they accepted partial integration into the global capitalist system. By doing so, they established a relatively balanced relationship with international capital—benefiting from it while ensuring their own continued existence.
Summary of the historical experiences of the Soviet Union and China:
In the era of global capitalist dominance—the period in which we currently live—an adversarial confrontation with the capitalist system is no longer feasible. The collapse of the Soviet Union was not merely a political failure but a discursive one, rooted primarily in economic and structural deficiencies.
To prevent a similar downfall, China swiftly transformed its party cadres into agents of a capitalist framework. In essence, the reason behind the Chinese Communist Party’s survival lies in its deliberate establishment of a capitalist economic structure—one that must serve the broader global capitalist system to ensure its continued existence.
The acquisition of billions of dollars in shares from American and European corporations, along with the facilitation of transferred capital into China through the provision of cheap labor, all underscore a fundamental reality: in the modern world, any nation aspiring to industrialization and progress must either contribute significantly to the global capitalist system or face isolation, stagnation, and economic hardship—like North Korea and Cuba—or, as was the case with the Soviet Union, ultimately integrate into the global capitalist order.
Similarly, Hashemi Rafsanjani, drawing from China’s experience in converting party cadres into economic managers, attempted to transition members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Jihad, and other institutions into economic administrators. However, systemic corruption in Iran’s economic and political spheres, coupled with clerical apprehensions regarding the expansion of capitalism, led to the emergence of a new, unprincipled wealthy class lacking clear identity.
At the same time, it is essential to recognize that the industrialized West, in its entirety, is neither willing nor inclined to provide unreserved economic benefits to other nations. Achieving a mutually beneficial political-economic relationship with the West requires a long and complex process—one that involves navigating various intermediary and hybrid stages, alongside the rise of fiercely nationalist political figures and revolutionary technocrats.
The most successful examples of such engagements include China, Japan, and the Southeast Asian nations. To reach a similar level, Iran must be led by political leaders and parties whose priorities extend beyond religion, monarchy, Wilayat al-Faqih and Bayt-e Wilayat al-Faqih interests—leaders who place the well-being of the Iranian people above all else.
In today’s Iran, only one progressive slogan holds true: “Iran First.” All other considerations—whether partisan, religious, or sectarian—come after. The baseless claims that Shi’ism, Islam, clerical authority, or monarchy serve as the cement binding the people of Iran together are merely reactionary efforts by religious and royalist factions to obstruct the country’s modernization. Ultimately, only a constitution shaped by the collective vote of representatives from all citizens and ethnic groups can serve as the true guarantor of Iran’s national and territorial unity.
What is the duty of the Islamic Republic in this situation?
The Islamic Republic, as the political manifestation of the Islamic Revolution’s discourse, has existed for only four decades. Given its current characteristics, it lacks the capability to both serve capitalism and receive benefits from it. Firstly, Shiite clerics, as the claimants and representatives of the Islamic Revolution, unlike communists in the Soviet Union and China—who represented aspects of modern discourse—see no future for themselves in the economic and social relations of the post-Islamic Republic era. In the Soviet Union and China, communists gradually evolved into a middle class responsible for bureaucratic governance. Consequently, in all former Soviet states, these former communists have become part of the capitalist political and economic structures. It is ironic—perhaps even historically inevitable—that today’s capitalist administrators in Russia and China were once nurtured within the most anti-capitalist political organizations, namely the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and China. Based on this pattern, the future administrators and leaders of the post-Islamic Republic system—those who will eventually lead its overthrow—are currently growing and developing within the very framework of the Islamic Republic itself.
Advanced Iran in Opposition and Contrast to Islamic Iran!
The difference between the two instances of anti-capitalist political systems dissolving into capitalist structures, compared to the Islamic Republic, lies in the fact that a party bureaucrat in the Soviet Union of the past or contemporary China did not perceive the expansion of the capitalist system in their country as a threat to their survival. However, a cleric, a Hezbollah Velayi, or even traditional social classes in Iran view the spread of capitalism as existentially threatening. They experience suffocation and despair in a capitalist environment. In other words, a cleric or even a Hezbollah Velayi in Iran cannot envision a future for themselves in the country after the Islamic Republic.
The Iranian clerical establishment, when seeking to allow the growth of capital and its cultural manifestations, faces two significant obstacles:
1. Opposition from Traditional Classes: These classes, gathered within the ranks of the Revolutionary Guard, the Basij4, Hawza Ilmiyya55[3], Awqaf[4], and the custodians of holy shrines, benefit from highly corrupt and uncontrollable economic structures rooted in Islamic economics. Due to resistance from these institutions, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei refrains from any efforts to modernize Iran’s economy. In response to their objections, he must take a step back. Of course, this assumes that the clerical establishment is even inclined to integrate into the global capitalist system—an assertion that remains highly questionable.
2. The Growth of the Middle and Wealthy Classes: Another obstacle to integrating the Islamic Republic into the global economy and fostering relations with Western political systems is the inevitable expansion of Iran’s middle and affluent classes. If economic ties with the West deepen, these groups will grow, which will increase their influence in the economy and labor force. This development would likely trigger opposition from political activists with pro-American, monarchist, or even pro-Israeli tendencies. Today, even the families of many reformists, bureaucrats, and reconstructionist parties embrace Western lifestyles and despise revolutionary and interventionist Islamic ideologies.
Faced with these challenges, the Velayi cleric , led by Khamenei, has no choice but to hinder Iran’s industrialization, mechanization of agriculture, and economic advancement—leading to an inevitable stagnation in the Islamic Republic. The issue of multiple exchange rates for foreign currencies and the subsidies provided by the corrupt Islamic economy to loyalist importers, Hezbollah affiliates, and semi-private company owners constitutes a fundamental barrier to domestic production and economic independence.
Economic independence entails the growth of domestic producers, national capital, and the emergence of a middle class. It also signifies increased engagement with the West—following the path that China has adopted—all of which pose an existential threat to the clerical establishment. The Velayi cleric will never willingly vote for their own demise, preferring instead that Iran remains underdeveloped but Islamic. For Khamenei, it is preferable to grant Hezbollah-affiliated private company owners access to foreign currency at favorable rates, and suppress independent exporters rather than risk antagonizing the corrupt importers who maintain vested interests in the system.
How does the Islamic Republic prevent Iran’s economic independence?
In the Velayi system, Hezbollah-affiliated importers purchase goods using a preferential exchange rate ranging from 4,000 to 28,000 tomans. They then sell the imported goods at the free-market dollar rate, pocketing significant profits while allocating a share to Bayt-e Wilayat al-Faqih, Jihad, and the Revolutionary Guard. The government and influential political entities manipulate currency values and commodity prices, thereby crippling domestic production. Additionally, the multiple exchange rate system serves as a mechanism for granting preferential treatment and bribery to loyalists. If these institutions and influential individuals are deprived of such financial privileges, they possess the capacity to push the regime into crisis.
The leadership of the Islamic Republic, due to the aforementioned reasons, has no choice but to actively create fundamental obstacles to the development of healthy capitalist relations within the country. The ruling system operates like a diseased organism afflicted with systemic lupus erythematosus, in which the body’s immune system attacks vital tissues and organs such as the eyes, brain, heart, and kidneys, rendering them dysfunctional. Similarly, the regime constantly undermines and destroys the essential components of economic growth and social progress.
The relationship between the Islamic Republic and Iran is akin to that of a cancerous cell and the recovery of a patient, where the malignant growth thrives only if the patient remains ill. In this analogy, the recovery of the patient inherently leads to the destruction of cancerous cells. On the other hand, the societal demands for overcoming economic and social crises necessitate an expansion of relations with the West, particularly with the United States.
The overthrow of the Islamic Republic is increasingly emerging as a widespread aspiration among the Iranian people, driven by their pursuit of a better life and a political structure beyond the paternalistic models of monarchy and theocratic rule. If the Islamic Republic succeeds in suppressing the people’s desire for social progress and economic growth, it will ultimately bring about the downfall of itself, Iran, and the nation’s future.
Contrary to the claims of Hezbollah-affiliated intellectuals, traditionalists, and certain Hezbollah supporters advocating for stronger relations with China and Russia, engagement with these two countries while Iran remains under international sanctions does not yield any tangible benefits for us.
Relations with China and Russia do not provide viable solutions for addressing major economic challenges, such as the restoration of oil wells and gas fields, the restructuring of unprofitable industrial automotive factories, or the modernization of agriculture. The required investment for the oil and gas extraction industry alone amounts to approximately $200 billion. However, neither China nor Russia possesses the capability or willingness to undertake such high-risk investments at this scale within the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Additionally, alongside these financial constraints, Iran faces environmental degradation, land subsidence, and the bankruptcy of pension funds. The government’s debt to these funds stands at 700 trillion tomans, while the state remains heavily indebted to banks—amounting to 1,100 trillion tomans. The maturity of government-issued bonds under President Raisi totals 850 trillion tomans. In total, the regime’s liabilities to the aforementioned organizations, as well as refineries, the central bank, and other entities, sum up to 9,700 trillion tomans. According to a report by the Research Center of the Iranian Parliament, published in Khabar Online, titled How Much Debt Does the Pezeshkian Government Have? in July 12, 2024. The theocratic system, under the ineffective leadership of President Pezeshkian, has plunged into a state of economic suffocation and crisis.
Contrary to the misleading propaganda of the regime’s loyalists, which suggests that BRICS countries will soon stand against the United States and Europe to rescue the Islamic Republic, these nations fundamentally lack any political will to engage in direct conflict with the West. Without economic ties to the world’s major capitalist hubs—Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom—they themselves would suffer economic stagnation.
China, Russia, and other BRICS countries merely use the alliance as a bargaining tool in their political and economic negotiations with the West. They neither possess the motivation nor the capacity to engage in an economic confrontation with the world’s financial superpowers. All these factors lead to the conclusion that, despite the colonial history of the leading nations in modernity and modernization, despite the stagnation of many aspects of modern life, and despite the fractures within different poles of the capitalist structure—from the United States and Europe to China and Russia—The Light Shines from the West.
The light emanates from the West
A quote from the late Daryush Shayegan serves as an insightful explanation of this phenomenon: The modernity that reached us Iranians, as well as the East, China, and Russia, was one that had already fallen into nihilism, existential void, and dead ends. This sense of despair was portrayed in literature—through the tragic suicide in Faust by Goethe, the self-destruction of Inspector Javert in Les Misérables by Victor Hugo—and was also challenged through the colonial ambitions of nations that claimed to embody modern civilization and superior humanitarian values.
During the Constitutional Revolution, we Iranians, in response to Abbas Mirza’s question, “What should be done with modernity?”, placed our hopes in an ideology that was itself at an impasse. However, we cannot fault our predecessors, the pioneers of constitutionalism, for seeking assistance from a faltering ideology. Even today, the modern discourse, capitalist economic structure, and liberal democracy—despite their shortcomings and constraints—remain the only viable and accessible pathways for progress.
Movements that have challenged and criticized modernity, including the October Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, and now the Islamic Revolution, have led to nothing but destruction and darkness when detached from reciprocal engagement with modern civilization. Now, as we enter the 15th century of the Iranian calendar, we must seek a path that neither places us—like the Pahlavi dynasty—in absolute servitude and blind trust toward the West, nor plunges us—like Islamic fundamentalist militants from ISIS, the Taliban, and the clerical establishment—into an endless confrontation with Western civilization.
The title of the article is taken from the book La lumière vient de l’Occident by the late Daryush Shayegan, which was published in Persian under the title The New Enchantment and the Fragmented Identity.
[1] Vali-ye Faqih or Supreme religious and political Leader refers to the political and religious authority within Iran’s governance system in other word It can be called as the rule of the clergy over the state.
[2] Shi’ian-e Velayi refers to Shi’a Muslims who deeply believe in the guardianship (Wilayah) of the Ahl al-Bayt (the family of the Prophet and now in absent of them the Shias, supreme clergies ) and consider adherence to their teachings essential in all aspects of life, including religious, social, and political matters. This term often emphasizes devotion to the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist).
Basij- is a paramilitary volunteer militia within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC WIKIPEDIA
[3] Hawza Ilmiyya refers to a Shi’a Islamic seminary where scholars are trained in Islamic jurisprudence, theology, and religious studies. The most prominent hawzas are located in Najaf, Iraq, and Qom, Iran.
8 Awqaf (plural of Waqf) refers to Islamic endowments, typically involving donations of property, land, or assets for religious, educational, or charitable purposes.
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